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Abstract. In January 2001 the Hungarian government increased the 
minimum wage from Ft 25,500 to Ft 40,000. One year later the wage floor 
rose further to Ft 50,000. The paper looks at the short-run impact of the first 
hike on small-firm employment and flows between employment and 
unemployment. It finds that the hike significantly increased labor costs and 
reduced employment in the small firm sector; and adversely affected the job 
retention and job finding probabilities of low-wage workers. While the 
conditions for a positive employment effect were mostly met in depressed 
regions spatial inequalities were amplified rather than reduced.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A decade of transition to the market economy brought Hungary’s 
employment ratio, similarly to most other transforming countries, down from 
one of the highest in the world to one of the lowest in Europe. There have 
been substantial inequalities behind the low aggregate rates. While the 
metropolitan areas and most of the highly industrialised zones of Central 
and Eastern Europe gradually recovered from the transformational recession 
the region still has a belt of low-employment, low-wage provinces along the 
former Soviet border and spots of similar districts within each country. The 
employment prospects of low-educated people, and the Roma community in 
general, remained faint all over the region. Most regions and occupations 
losing jobs also experienced falling relative wages during the transition. 
One reason why an array of demand-side employment policies ranging 
from tax holidays to investment and wage subsidies fail to exert substantial 
influence on the depressed labor markets can be that the problems, in fact, 
lie on the supply side. In a low-employment, low-wage environment the net 
gains from searching and working are modest as the fixed costs of search 
and work are relatively high, and the welfare benefits (most of them 
regionally unadjusted and many of them flat rate) provide relatively generous 
support to the non-employed. Household strategies and lifestyles relying on 
social transfers, home production, and casual jobs are gaining ground and 
provide alternatives to employment in the formal sector. Since in most 
depressed regions business density is particularly low, and only a few 
industries are present, more firms can use their monopsony power to 
restrain wages. The labor market may get to a bad equilibrium characterised 
by low levels of labor force participation and employment, low wages, little 
job search, frictions and incentive problems. 
By widening the gap between wages and income while unemployed the 
government can potentially break a low equilibrium of this type but the 
policies aimed at this end such as the cuts of benefits, restrictions placed on 
the hidden economy, and increases in the minimum wage are particularly 
risky. If mis-diagnosed, a depressed labor market may react to such  
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treatments producing even more frictions, falling employment, and growing 
poverty. The Hungarian government in office between 1998 and 2002 made 
two attempts at breaking what it diagnosed as a low equilibrium state 
primarly explained by supply-side deficiencies. Following cuts in the 
unemployment benefits in January-May 20001 the minimum wage was 
doubled in two steps starting from January 1, 2001. In this paper we look at 
the short-run consequences of the first hike of 57 %.2 
Section 2 gives a brief overview of the arguments for a potentially positive 
employment effect. Section 3 discusses the magnitude of the shock to the 
labor market and justifies the choice of fields for a deeper analysis. Section 4 
presents descriptive statistics suggesting that the overall effect of the hike 
was most probably negative with the strongest influence expected in the 
small-firm sector and marginal (exit and entry portal) jobs.  
Section 5 shows that 43.5 % of the workers employed in small firms (5-
20 employees) were directly affected by the minimum wage hike, and average 
wages ought to have increased by 11.4 % overnight to close the gap opened 
by the new minimum wage. The elasticity of the average wage with respect to 
this gap ranged between 0.65 and 0.77 suggesting higher levels of 
compliance in high-unemployment regions. Given an estimated wage 
elasticity of employment of –0.41 in our preferred specification of a 
simultaneous equations model this implied elasticites of employment with 
respect to the gap between –0.26 and –0.31 suggesting more severe 
employment cuts in depressed regions. The results from alternative 
specifications are similar. Large firms more exposed to the minimum wage 
shock also had less favourable employment records in 2001 but the 
estimates were not statistically significant in the small sample available for 
the analysis. Data on medium sized firms are not available. 
                                                             
1 The maximum duration of UI was shortened from 12 to 9 months, and the UA benefit available for UI 
exhausters on a means-tested basis was replaced by a social benefit (SB) administered by local governments. The 
restrictive eligibility conditions of SB (participation in public works whenever called, the real estate of the 
recipients mortgaged) led to a two-digit fall in the probability of  benefit receipt among the UI exhausters 
without remarkable effect on their job finding rates (Galasi and Nagy 2001b). Likewise, the cutting of UI 
eligibility had no measurable impact on the exit to jobs rate of the recipients (Galasi and Nagy 2001a).  
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Section 6 compares workers paid the minimum wage to those paid 
marginally above the minimum wage by means of a discrete time duration  
model of jobloss using quarterly Labor Force Survey (LFS) data. Minimum 
wage workers were twice as likely to lose their jobs 4-12 months after the 
hike than their marginally better paid counterparts. This result relates to 
workers who spent a minimum of two years and an average of seven years in 
their jobs prior to the hike. The risk of jobloss was unrelated to local 
unemployment in the control group but positively related among minimum 
wage workers. 
Section 7 estimates the job finding probabilities of the low-wage 
unemployment insurance benefit (UI) recipients relative to the low-skilled 
recipients using grouped data from 172 labor offices and 54 months in 1998-
2002. Depending on specification the finding is that the relative exit rate of 
the low-wage unemployed fell by 7-9 percentage points in 2001 and further 
2-3 percentage points in January-July 2002 with the effects being similar 
across regions. 
Taken together, the results yield support to the view that a huge increase 
in the minimum wage comes at the cost of jobs. The finding that depressed 
regions were equally or even worse affected than others underlines the 
importance of the `classic’ demand-side reactions even in environments 
where the conditions of a positive effect are met. 
2. MINIMUM WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT 
Most, if not all, models calling into question the conventional wisdom of 
negative employment effects of the minimum wage abandon the assumption 
of an infinitely elastic supply curve facing the firm. The benchmark model 
assuming a positively sloped labor supply curve is that of a local monopsony. 
Since the firm is the only buyer it can only hire additional workers by 
increasing the wage. If, as generally assumed, the marginal worker’s wage 
can be increased only if the wages of other workers are also increased the 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
2 The data for the study of the second hike are not available as yet. Furthermore, the identification of minimum 
wage effects seems much more difficult because of the shocks caused by the world-wide recession and 
Hungary’s parliamentary elections of 2002.    
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firm’s marginal expenditure on labor curve is steeper than its supply curve. 
Employment is set at the point where marginal expenditure equals marginal 
revenue while the wage is set at the lowest level compatible with that level of 
employment given the supply curve. A hike in the minimum wage can 
decrease the firm’s marginal expenditure on labor and lead to a concomitant 
increase in wages and employment at the cost of the monopsony rent. A ‘too 
high’ minimum wage hike, however, may shift the marginal expenditure 
regime upwards in the vicinity of the current employment level and result in 
a loss of jobs.3 
The modern theories developed to understand why the employment 
effects can be negligible or even positive are generalisations of the 
monopsony model in several ways. Early models of a positive employment 
effect were developed many years before any supporting evidence was 
available. In a partial equilibrium model Mincer (1976) showed that 
depending on how the turnover rate and the elasticities of demand and 
supply relate to each other employment can increase, and unemployment 
can fall, as a result of a minimum wage hike.4 The efficiency wage theorem 
and the search friction models of Mortensen (1988) and Burdett and 
M o r t e n s e n  ( 1 9 8 9 )  w e r e  a l s o  w i d e l y  k n o w n  b e f o r e  a  s e r i e s  o f  s e m i n a l  
empirical papers including Card (1992a,b), Katz and Krueger (1992) and 
Card and Krueger (1994, 1995) opened new chapter in the study of 
minimum wages.  
These studies, together with Machin and Manning (1994) and Dolado et 
al. (1996) in Europe, found weak, zero, or even positive effects on 
employment. The time-series evidence from this period also suggested 
weaker negative impact than before (Brown, 1999). This challenge gave new 
impetus to both the empirical and the theoretical research and also affected 
the political debate over minimum wages. 
                                                             
3 The discussion and graphic presentation of the argument are found in labor economics textbooks including 
Ehrenberg and Smith (2002). 
4 For employment to be higher and unemployment lower s>η>σ should hold where σ is the turnover rate, and η 
and s are the demand and supply elasticities respectively.  
5 
The logics underlying the benchmark monopsony model can indeed be 
applied to a variety of market structures. While single-employer towns are 
infrequent many firms can be the sole buyer of certain skills in the local 
labor market. Even in large, open markets mobility costs provide nearly all 
enterprises with a degree of monopsony power. A multitude of firms can be 
supply-constrained by search frictions - inasmuch as a higher minimum 
wage reduces these frictions by encouraging job search and promoting 
competition for job openings it can have positive impact on employment even 
if some firms go bankrupt. (Ahn and Arcidiacono, 2003). Wages, productivity 
and employment can simultaneously rise if workers respond by increasing 
their effort as predicted in the efficiency wage models of Rebitzer and Taylor 
(1991) and others.5 Distortions on the labor market can also drive the 
outcome far from the competitive prediction. In the monopsonistic 
competition model of Bashkar and To (1999) the direction of change depends 
on the share of fixed costs within labor costs with higher shares predicting 
an increase in employment and vice versa. In a model of dual wage 
determination with unskilled wages set by the government and skilled wages 
negotiated in a Nash-bargain Cahuc et al. (2001) find positive employment 
effect under the condition that unskilled and skilled workers are highly 
substitutable. 
The competitive theory has not been overthrown by these theoretical 
innovations – nor was its central prediction discredited by the available 
empirical findings. The Card-Krueger results were themselves subject to 
criticism by Neumark and Wascher (1992) and others, and a whole array of 
papers found significant negative impact of higher minimum wages including 
Deere, Murphy and Welch (1996) and Neumark and Wascher (2002) in the 
US, Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) in a US-France comparison, Bell 
(1997) and Maloney and Mendez (2003) in Colombia, Carneiro (2000) in 
Brazil, Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1991) in Puerto Rico, El Hamidi and 
                                                             
5 A difficult point to explain in the efficiency wage models is why the parties wait for the government instead of 
increasing the lowest wages - once they all gain from it. It might be argued that a higher minimum wage enforces 
managers to search for well-functioning incentive schemes, something they were not deeply interested to do 
before, and in this sense the minimum wage hike can indeed be interpreted as a cause of higher employment and 
productivity.  
6 
Terrell (1997) in Costa Rica (for the upper tiers of the industrial minimum 
wage/average ratios), Pereira (1999) in Portugal (for teenagers); Rama (2000) 
and Alatas and Cameron (2003) in Indonesia (for small firms). The effects 
found in these papers are often small and restricted to certain segments of 
the market but they lend support to the orthodox approach while a similarly 
massive body of evidence confirming the predictions of the ’new economics of 
the minimum wage` is hard to find in the current empirical literature.  
The Hungarian government’s motives to radically increase the minimum 
wage were presented in popular form (the hike will ‘restore the prestige of 
work’, combat `living on benefits’, ‘whiten the black economy’, and so on) but 
the political slogans actually drafted some key arguments of the new 
economics of the minimum wage. It was repeatedly argued in interviews and 
press briefings that a higher minimum wage stimulates work effort, leads to 
higher productivity, makes the hiring of additional workers easier, and by 
widening the gap between benefits and wages creates proper incentives for 
paid employment and job search. 6 
The forces to be offset by these mechanisms were by no means negligible. 
The available evidence suggested that Hungarian firms were responsive to 
labor costs particularly in the low-wage segment of the market. Estimating 
differenced conditional labor demand equations for homogeneous labor 
Kőrösi (1998, 2000) found relatively low but significantly negative short-run 
elasticities of between –0.55 and –0.65 in 1992-95 and –0.31 and –0.33 in 
1996-97. A translog cost function model estimated in repeated cross-
sections by Kertesi and Köllő (2002b) yielded rather high own-wage 
elasticities of –0.8 for skilled and –1.4 for unskilled labor on average in 1996-
1999.7 A positive employment effect offseting the shock to labor demand 
                                                             
6 The stereotype of general support on the political left and opposition on the right does definitely not help in 
understanding the case. The hikes were decided by a right-wing government explicitly committed to increasing 
the welfare of the middle class and promoting the competitiveness of domestic businesses including exporters - 
an unusual candidate for aggressive minimum wage policies. At least the first hike was opposed by the largest 
trade union federation of socialist orientation (MSZOSZ) worried about the potentially adverse employment 
effects (Berki, 2003). Alleged EU guidelines were repeatedly mentioned but have never been documented. The 
claim is nevertheless credible and familiar from the Indonesian and Puerto Rican cases where pressures on the 
part of the US and other trade partners played important role.  
7 Unlike a differenced dynamic model the cross-section translog estimates are long-run elasticities with the ‘long 
run’ lasting from one equilibrium state to another.  
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could be expected, if anywhere, in the country`s most depressed regions 
characterised by low participation rates, low search intensity, high benefits 
relative to wages, high shares of the informal economy, relatively high travel-
to-work costs, and more frequent occurance of monopsony settings.  
3. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE MINIMUM WAGE SHOCK 
The mandatory minimum wage, introduced in 1989 by Hungary’s last 
communist government, relates to gross monthly earnings net of overtime 
pay, shift pay and bonuses, is legally binding and covers all employment 
contracts. For part-timers accounting for only 3.5 % of all employees the 
minimum is proportionally lower. In 1990-1998 the adjustments were 
negotiated annually by a national-level tripartite council and entered into 
effect in the annual budgets while under the cabinet of 1998-2002 the wage 
floor was set unilaterally by the government. 
At its introduction the minimum amounted to 34.6 % of the average 
wage, a level deep below the European average and slightly higher than that 
of Spain, the laggard within the EU. (Compare with Dolado et al. 1996). 
During a decade of transition the relative value of the minimum was falling 
and reached a low of 29% in 2000. This trend was broken by the two hikes 
bringing the index up to 39% in 2001 and 43% in 2002 – levels still lower 
than the EU average but higher than those of the UK, Spain or Portugal. 
 An alternative indicator of how the minimum wage relates to the ’market 
wage’ is the fraction of workers paid at or near the mandatory wage floor. 
This ratio was slowly increasing from less than 1% in 1989, 3% in 1997 and 
5% in 2000.8 The ratio jumped to 12.1% in 2001 and 17.3% in 2002 -  while 
before the hikes Hungary was located in the lower part of the OECD range 
together with Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the US in 
only twelve months it shifted to the position of a heavy outlier with an 
extraordinarly high fraction of minimum-wage workers. 
                                                             
8 The ratios relate to the share of full-time employees paid 95-105 % of the minimum wage in firms employing 
more than 5 workers in 1999-2002, 10 workers in 1995-98, and 20 workers in 1989-95. The data are calculated 
using the Wage Survey (WS henceforth). The opposite movement of the Kaitz index and the share of minimum 
wage workers was explained by the build-up of a sizeable low-wage population.  
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Both the welfare and cost effects of a minimum wage hike depend on its 
influence on average wages rather than the percentage increase of the 
minimum itself. A benchmark indicator of a firm’s or occupation’s exposure 
to the minimum wage hike can be defined as: 
 
with F denoting the fraction of workers paid below the new minimum wage at 
the moment of the hike, wF being their average wage, wH standing for the 
average wage of other workers and w* for the new minimum wage. The 
formula measures the average wage gap to be filled on the day of the hike 
under the assumption that all sub-minimum wages are raised to the level of 
the new minimum and there is no further instantaneous wage and 
employment adjustment. As such, ω is a hypothetical benchmark that does 
not measure the actual response of average earnings but serves as a useful 
starting point for the study of actual evolutions. We prefer ω to the 
customarily used F as the latter ignores valuable information on the pre-hike 
earnings level of low-wage workers while, in fact, both indicators rely on the 
same assumptions in measuring exposure. 
The minimum wage hike was estimated to cause an immediate shock of 
2.33% to the economy-wide average monthly base wage at January 1, 2001 
under the conditions mentioned above. Calculating exposure for the 
interactions of 5 age groups, 3 educational levels, and 4 quartiles of the 150 
micro-regions by unemployment we get that group-level exposure varied in a 
wide range between 0.3% and 16.7% with the estimates being 1 % for 
workers with secondary and higher qualification and 6 % with primary or 
lower education; 1 % for workers older than 45 and 6.1 % for those under 
25; 1.7 % for the ’best’ ¼ of regions and 3.6 % for the least fortunate 
quartile. The average wages of workers under 35 years of age with primary or 
vocational education who lived in the `worse’ half of the regions were 
)] 1 ( [( )] 1 ( [ ) 1 ( F w F w F w F w H F H − + − + =
∗ ω 
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expected to rise by as much as 9.7-16.7 % at the moment of the hike. The 
dispersion of the group-level ω-s is shown later. 9 
Table 1: Compliance with the law – Selected indicators 
 
    Source, date, unit of observation
Paid below the minimum wage (%)    
Full time employees  1.9  WS, May 2001, payroll data
Full time employees  3.6  LFS, April-June 2001, individuals
Full time employees  1.4  EJS, April 2001, individuals
All employees  5.5  LFS, April-June 2001, individuals
All employees  2.6  EJS, April 2001, individuals
  
Paid as a subcontractor (%)  1.5  EJS, April 2001, individuals
   
Elasticities with respect to ω   
∂(base wage)/ ∂ ω  0.96  WS, May 2001/May 2000
60 interactions of age×education×region 
1
∂(earnings)/ ∂ ω  1.00  WS, May 2001/ May 2000
2
60 interactions of age×education×region
∂(earnings+taxes)/∂ω  1.00  FR, 2001/2000, 432 industries 
3
∂(all payments to persons +taxes)/∂ω  0.95  FR, 2001/2000, 432 industries
 4
    
Notes:  
1) OLS estimates from a model wherein the log change of the group’s average base wage was regressed 
on group-level ln(ω) and a dummy for higher education background. 
2) Earnings include overtime pay, shift pay, and bonuses  
3) 2sls estimates from a two-equations system composed of a wage equation (RHS variables are the log 
change in productivity, fraction unionised, mean regional unemployment, and sector dummies) and an 
employment equation (RHS variables are the log change of output, the minimum wage shock indicator 
ω, share of small firms in the industry, and sector dummies). Monetary aggregates were discounted 
using industry-level PPI (32 distinct values). Wages, employment and hence productivity were assumed 
to be endogenous. 
4) Other payments include per diem, honoraria and various casual pecuniary benefits that can also be 
paid to persons who are not counted as employees.  
 
 
Checking whether the increased minima were actually paid is essential in a 
country where non-compliance with the state regulations has been 
traditionally wide-spread. The indicators collected in Table 1 unequivocally 
suggest high levels of compliance. The proportion of full-time workers paid 
below the new minimum in May was only 1.9 % according to payroll data 
reported in the WS. Likewise, only 1.4 % of the full-time workers interviewed 
in the UI Exit to Jobs Survey (EJS), and 3.6 of the respondents of the Labor 
                                                             
9 The data were taken from the WS. Since our wage observations related to May we spoke of sub-minimum 
wages if  a worker’s wage was lower than w*/(1+r) where r was the rate of wage inflation between May and the 
time of the minimum wage increase.On the basis of the monthly wage data available at the Central Statistical 
Office we set r at 0.32 % per month between May and November 2000. The data on monthly earnings in  
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Force Survey (LFS), reported gross monthly earnings below Ft 40,000 in 
April-June 2001.10 These are upper-bound estimates since unpaid leave and 
other disturbances can temporarily result in sub-minimum monthly 
earnings. 
There are hidden ways of escaping the regulations, however. First, 
firms may employ their workers full-time but register them as part-time and 
pay sub minimum monthly wages. The fact that the fraction earning sub-
minimum wages within all wage earners including part-timers was only 5.5 
% in the LFS and 2.6 % in the EJS suggests that these practices were of 
minor importance. Second, firms may fraudulently lay off their workers and 
contract with them as ’trade partners’. According to the EJS only 1.5 % of 
the low-wage UI recipients who found a job in April 2001 concluded a 
business contract with the employer as opposed to 64.7 % receiving a fixed 
salary and 33.8 % paid an hourly wage. Third, and most importantly, firms 
can increase the base wage and reduce some side payments exempt from the 
regulations. The pecuniary offsets, however, unveil in comparisons of base 
wages with broader concepts of worker compensation. Most side payments, 
especially shift pay and overtime pay, are set as percentages of the base 
wage therefore regular monthly earnings are expected to rise at 
approximately the same rate as do base wages if the firms comply with the 
regulations. As shown in the bottom of the table, the estimates of the 
elasticity of earnings and labor costs with respect to ω (using grouped and 
industry-level data) fall close to unity.  
While an elasticity of 1.0 does correspond to the expectation under full 
compliance, no pecuniary offsets, and no strong spillover effects it may 
actually result from other scenarios. Therefore compliance is further tested 
in Figure 1 based on matched wage observations from May 2000 and 2001. 
In lack of any panel data on wages we created a quasi-panel of individuals 
observed in the 2000 and 2001 waves of the WS. Though individuals cannot 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
December are severely affected by year-end premia and bonuses on the one hand, and year-end holidays on the 
other, and were therefore disregarded.  
10 The bias from not distinguishing between base wages and earnings is predictably minimal as these fall close to 
each other at the lower tiers of the wage distribution. The average earnings and base wages of workers earning 
less than Ft 40,000 in May 2001 were Ft 35,025 and Ft 34,736, respectively. (WS)  
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be identified across waves of the WS one can try to match those with the 
same firm ID, plant location, gender, year of birth, level of education and 
four-digit occupational code. Excluding multiple matches we got a panel of 
52,057 full-time employees with information on their wages. For this sample 
we could calculate the mean and standard deviation of the May 2001 wages 
along the percentiles of the May 2000 wage distribution – these are indicated 
by the connected curve and the vertical splines in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Average wages in May 2001 in the 1st-40th percentiles of the May 
2000 wage distribution – Comparison with predictions from three scenarios 
WS Individual Panel 2000-2001, N=52,057 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sum of squared residuals⋅10
-6 in the 1
st-40
th percentiles:  
Non-compliance 47.3, spillover 9.03, compliance with no spillover 7.49. 
 
Actual wages are compared to predictions from three scenarios. Each 
assumes that wages grew by the product of inflation and GDP growth in the 
40th-100th percentiles – this assumption predicts actual wage increases 
almost perfectly in the upper tiers of the distribution. Scenario 1 marked 
with ”+” assumes that the minimum wage hike had no effect at all, wages 
grew by the main rule all along the distribution. Scenario 2 marked with 
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circles makes the assumptions underlying ω: wages below Ft 40,000 in 
January 2001 were upgraded but other wages were not affected. Finally, 
Scenario 3 marked with diamonds assumes that wages in the 1st percentile 
were upgraded, the 40th-100th percentiles were unaffected, while in the 2nd- 
39th percentiles growth was also influenced by a spillover effect. (The rates 
were approximated with linear interpolation). The data clearly reject the 
assumption of no effect – Scenario 1 crudely under-estimates the rate of 
wage growth in the lower tail of the distribution. Scenario 2 slightly under-
estimates wage growth in the 1st-40th percentiles and the opposite holds for 
Scenario 3. The sum of errors is lowest with Scenario 2 assuming full 
compliance and minor short-run spillover effects. The best fitting scenario, 
generating predictions very close to the observed data, would be a mixed one 
assuming minimum wages in percentiles 1-10, no effect above the 40th 
percentile and successively lower rates of spillover in percentiles 11-40.  
The wage evolutions would certainly deserve closer inspection but for 
this paper, concerned with the sign of the employment effect, the important 
result is that the first minimum wage hike was certainly effective causing an 
unexpected and severe shock to the Hungarian labor market. 
6. CHANGES OF EMPLOYMENT – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This section presents descriptive statistics raising the conjecture that the 
minimum wage hike of 2001 came at the cost of jobs. Figure 2  indicates a 
sudden break in the growth of aggregate employment in January 2001. The 
dotted line depicts seasonally adjusted employment in the non-agricultural 
private sector in 1998-2002.11 The path of employment growth prior to 2001 
could be precisely approximated with a quadratic form indicated by the solid 
curve.12 Employment growth was gradually slowing down during the 
observed period with the monthly growth rates falling from 0.027% in 1998-
1999 to 0.018% in 2000. Had this slow-down continued in 2001-2002, as 
                                                             
11 Though the LFS results are published quarterly the data allow the calculation of monthly employment levels. 
The data used here were seasonally adjusted at the National Bank of Hungary. The authors are greatful to 
Barnabás Ferenczi of the Bank for sharing the adjusted series. The seasonally adjusted quarterly figures relating 
to the whole economy, as published by the Central Statistical Office, depict a similar path of employment.  
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depicted by the extrapolated part of the curve, aggregate employment should 
have grown further by 2.8% in January-December 2001 when it actually 
decreased by 0.2 %.  
Figure 2 
Seasonally adjusted monthly 
employment 1998-2002 
LFS, adjusted by the National Bank,  
agriculture and the public sector excluded, 
Head counts, million 
Figure 3 
GDP and seasonally adjusted 
quarterly employment 1998-2002. 
LFS and National Accounts, agriculture and 
the public sector excluded 
1997 4th quarter = 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      1998        1999      2000      2001      2002                      1998         1999        2000      2001   2002 
                   
This remains true if we consider the path of employment relative to GDP. 
Since the start of employment’s recovery from the transformational recession 
the economy followed a path at which 1% growth of GDP was associated with 
0.5 % growth of employment as shown in Figure 3. The chart has GDP on the 
horizontal axis and employment on the vertical axis both normalized to their 
1997 4th quarter levels. The rate of GDP growth is captured by the distance 
between the vertical lines separating the years while the relation between 
employment and GDP is captured by the slope of the fitted line. For lack of 
monthly GDP data we turn to quarterly figures. The economy was slowing 
down in 2001 but a moderate fall of employment after the minimum wage 
hike was clearly at odds with the experience of the preceding years. Even 
with the slow-down of growth employment would have been expected to rise 
by about 1.7 % in 2001 and 1.8% in 2002 at the given rates of GDP growth.  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
12 We have a technical and a substantive reason not to include the pre-1998 period in the time series. First, 
seasonally adjusted monthly data are not available for 1992-97. Second, and more importantly following almost 
a decade of deep crisis employment started to increase in 1998. 
months 1998-2002
 National Bank estimate  trend 4672*t-28.5*tsq
0 12 24 36 48 60
1.5
1.55
1.6
1.65
1.7
GDP, 1997.q4=1
 Private sector empl, 1997.q4=1  Fitted values
1 1.043 1.108 1.159 1.198 1.242
1
1.05
1.1
1.15 
14 
The data on the age×education×region interactions introduced earlier 
suggests that a group’s employment record in 2001 was closely related to its 
exposure to the minimum wage shock (Figure 4). The slopes of the best-
fitting lines across the scatter plot were estimated for all groups and 40 
unskilled groups.13 The weighted data suggested employment elasticities 
with respect to ω of –0.45 for all groups and –1.29 for unskilled groups with 
the unweighted estimates being slightly higher in absolute value.  
 
Figure 4: Change of employment and the minimum wage shock in 60 groups 
2000. 4th quarter - 2001. 4th quarter. Data: LFS 
 
       Log change of the employment ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The patterns observed in 2000-2001 were clearly at odds with previous 
experience. As shown in Table 2, the groups exposed to strong minimum 
wage shock in 2001 had average or better than average employment records 
in the preceding years. In 1998-1999 the group level ω-s (as of 2000) and 
employment change were uncorrelated while in 1999-2000 the low-wage 
groups experienced a rise in their relative employment probabilities.  
Another argument against interpreting the observed correlations as 
minimum wage effects, tentatively either, refers to the potentially non-
                                                             
13 The regressions have employment levels on the left hand, controlled change in the number of working age 
adults who do not attend school and do not recieve old-age pension. This is required because the rotation of the 
LFS sample leads to variations in the size of the groups observed and therefore employment. The coefficients of 
this variable are close to unity as expected under random fluctuations in group size. For lack of sufficient 
observations workers above the retirement age were dropped. The equations include an age dummy to control for 
the effect of increasing the retirement age by one year on 1999-2000.   
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neutral impact of the recession following September 11, 2001. However, 
similarly to the aggregate statistics the grouped data suggest that low-wage 
employment started to fall immediately after the minimum wage hike. This 
can be tested by regressing the employment ratios of the groups on ω in 
panels comprising quarters 1, 1-2, 1-3 and 1-4, respectively and showing 
that the coefficients were weakly affected by the extension of the panel period 
(The results are available on request). 
 
Table 2 : Employment and exposure to the 2001 minimum wage increase 
Dependent: log change of employment.  
 
            1998-1999            1999-2000            2000-2001 
  All Unskilled    All Unskilled   All Unskilled 
ln(ω)  .2106 
(0.68) 
-.0081 
(0.02) 
 .5051 
(2.33) 
-.3450 
(0.87) 
 -.4195 
(1.95) 
-1.234 
(3.22) 
∆ln(POP)  1.1565 
(13.11) 
1.2291 
(10.17) 
 1.1175 
(24.3) 
.9714 
(8.92) 
 .9940 
(13.42) 
.9125 
(9.37) 
Age>54 .1436 
(3.57) 
.1434 
(2.55) 
 .2159 
(8.38) 
.0671 
(3.31) 
 .0586 
(2.33) 
.0440 
(1.2) 
Constant  -.0053  .0198  -.0013  .0185  .0055  .0620 
Adj R
2  .7811  .7352  .9153  .8283  .7616  .7584 
Goups  60  40  60  40  60  40 
OLS regressions, t-values in brackets. Data on employment: LFS 1998-2001 Q4. Data on exposure: WS 2000. 
Employment is defined on ILO-OECD grounds. The groups are weighted with their population size in the base 
period. ω denotes exposure of the group to the minimum wage increase in 2001. POP stands for the working age 
population less old-age pensioners and students in 1999-2001, and the working age population in 1998-99. Due 
to change in the registration of student status in 1999 the definition used later was not applicable. 
 
The tables and charts presented in this section raise the suspicion that the 
minimum wage hike adversely affected employment but they obviously do 
not identify this effect. For a deeper analysis we chose fields with an eye on 
the potential effects, macro-economic relevance, and data availability. Most 
empirical studies of the minimum wage concentrate on youth employment 
and low-wage industries in both the US and Europe but we deviate from this 
tradition because the data summarised in appendix tables B1 and B2 hints 
at more important dimensions.  
The vast majority of the Hungarian minimum wage workers are 25-54 
year old with only 20 % being younger than 25 and a mere 2 % being 
teenager. Half of the minimum wage workers have more than 20 years of 
experience. By contrast, a high concentration of minimum wage workers is 
observed with short tenures: about 20-25 % of the minimum wage workers  
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had tenures shorter than one year; nearly 40 % worked less than 2 years 
and 60 % had less than 5 years with the firm - while only 4.4 % spent less 
than 5 years on the labor market. Estimates from data sets recording both 
experience and tenure also suggest that the probability of low wages are 
affected much stronger by tenure than experience. 
The differences by personal characteristics and industrial affiliation 
depict the familiar picture. Women and low-skilled workers are slightly over-
represented among the minimum wage workers. The young and those 
employed in high-unemployment regions are more likely to earn low wages, 
and so do the employees of the light industry, trade, hotels and restaurants, 
road transport, services and insurance. 14  No, or very few, low-wage workers 
are found in petroleum mining and refining, banking, research and 
development, public transport, and the tobacco industry. Budapest and the 
regions around Lake Balaton, Hungary’s major tourist zone, have relatively 
high fractions of low-wage workers. These are, however, not the most 
important dimensions: firm size and the firms’s level of productivity have 
much stronger impact. The pseudo-R2 of a logit model explaining the 
occurence of sub-minimum wages in 2000 (Table A1) for instance increases 
from 0.18 to 0.35 by the inclusion of these two indicators and a model with 
only these two variables has a better fit (0.24) than a model including 
gender, experience, education, region and industry.  
We conclude from these data that the study of minimum wage effects 
should primarily focus on the small-firm and/or low-income sector of the 
economy, and the flows between short-tenured ‘entry-portal jobs’ and non-
employment. These, rather than teenage employment or the low-skilled labor 
market in general seem to be the adequate fields for the empirical 
investigation. 
5.  EMPLOYMENT IN SMALL FIRMS 2000-2001 
When the minimum wage is increased the actual changes of wages (∆w) 
are expected to exert stronger than usual influence on employment given a 
truly exogeneous variation in wage adjustment. This effect can be captured  
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by comparing the α2 coefficients over time of conditional labor demand 
equations similar to (2) with L,  q and w standing for employment, real 
output and real average wages, and X containing controls. This is a useful 
tool at the researcher`s disposal when no direct information is available on 
firms’ exposure to the minimum wage increase. As an example see Kim and 
Taylor (1995) on Califoria`s retail trade industry.   
 
More reliable models become available when the researcher has information 
on  F,  ω, or some other indicators of exposure. Machin, Manning and 
Rahman (2003) estimate an equation analogous to (2) by instrumenting w 
with their ’shock to the average wage’ variable, a close relative to our ω, and 
treating other firm-level variables as exogeneous.  
The impact of minimum wages via average wages can be explicitly 
modeled and incorporated into a system of equations in several ways. If the 
regressors in a wage equation similar to (3) are assumed to be exogeneous (3) 
can be substituted to (2) to estimate ∂L/∂ω=α2⋅β1, a parameter capturing the 
combined effect of compliance and the wage elasticity of demand for labor.  
 
There is a strong case, however, for leaving the question of exogeneity open 
when one works with firm-level average wages. Consider the simplest case 
when ω measures the shock to a firm employing workers with a particular 
type of skill that is the only input. Even though labor is homogeneous in 
terms of skills wage dispersion may arise as a result of individual 
productivity differentials or Becker-Stigler type bonding. What happens after 
a minimum wage hike depends on the nature of wage dispersion on the one 
hand, and complementarities and substitution on the other. If all workers 
are equally productive but wages differ because of bonding, and the firm 
insists on its bonding scheme, only an employment effect is at work. In other 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
14 This simply indicates that the agents are paid the minimum wage as the fixed part of their remuneration. 
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cases the firm substitutes low-productivity (low wage) for high-productivity 
workers – this results in ∆w>ω, a growth in productivity, while output and 
employment is affected by both substitution and scale effects. If low-wage 
and high-wage labor are complements the firm can also react to the 
minimum wage shock by dismissals biased against high-wage workers – this 
can result in ∆w<ω and a fall in output. Finally, the firm can choose to cut 
the unregulated components of  the compensation package and achieve 
∆w<ω without productivity loss, at least on the short run. (On the long run it 
risks losing its low-wage workers to other firms.) In order to cope with 
endogeneity and some other factors affecting compliance and employment we 
write a simultaneous equations system (4-5) with q,  L, and w treated as 
potentially endogenous.  
 
where  ∆ln(w) is the log change of the PPI-adjusted labor cost, ω is our 
benchmark of the shock to the average wage also discounted using the PPI, 
the  Uj-s are dummies for region quartiles by unemployment, L stands for 
employment, ∆ln(q) is the PPI-adjusted log change of value added; (K/L)0 and 
π0 are the base-period capital-labor ratio and profit respectively, and X 
comprises industry and region dummies.  
Wages are assumed to grow faster given ω in profitable firms able to 
share their income with their employees. A higher level of compliance is 
expected in depressed regions where failures to pay the new minimum wage 
would menace with the quitting of core workers. Therefore the minimum 
wage shock variable is interacted with regions allowing ω having different 
coefficients in high- and low-wage environments with the β1j-s expected to 
r i s e  a s  w e  m o v e  f r o m  l o w  t o  h i g h - u nemployment regions. Employment is 
assumed to respond to output and wages uniformly across regions as 
suggested by Kőrösi’s (2000) estimates. The equation includes the base 
period capital-labor ratio under the assumption that capital intensive firms 
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are less likely to react with dismissals on the short run. The 18 region 
dummies control for supply shifts and 10 industry dummies allow for 
demand shocks unobserved in ∆q, and changes in technology.  
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the exogeneity of labor costs but 
not of output. (The null of the test is that the residuals from regressions with 
∆ln(q)  and  ∆ln(q)  on the  LHS and all instruments on the RHS have zero 
coefficients in the employment equation). With ∆q treated as exogenous the 
system passes both the overidentification and the exclusion restrictions tests 
allowing the estimation with 3sls. (The test statistics are presented together 
with the estimation results). 
The estimates may also be affected by measurement error that is 
generally difficult to control, this paper being no exception. Let y denote 
nominal sales with p and P standing for firm-level and industry-level prices 
so that ∆ln(p)=∆ln(P)+∆ln(π). While in the structural equation we have 
∆ln(q)=∆ln(y)-∆ln(p), and a similar expression for real wages, in an estimable 
equation the observed nominal changes are discounted with ∆ln(P) and the 
residual becomes u=ν+(α1+α2)∆ln(π). For ω to be a valid instrument E(uω)=0 is 
required, which may not be the case if the within-industry variations in price 
movements are strongly correlated with the level of wages and hence ω. 
Since industrial shocks are quite often non-neutral the IV does not certainly 
mitigate the impact of measurement bias.15 Fortunately, the economy was 
free of major shocks until the end of 2001. 
Data. The data on annual average employment, labor costs and output 
were taken from the year-end financial reports (FR) of firms employing 5-20 
workers.  The sample was drawn from the population of enterprises 
interviewed in the 2000 and 2001 waves of the WS. A unique advantage of 
this sub sample is that firms employing 5-20 workers report individual data 
                                                             
15 This is less of a problem in the Machin-Manning-Rahman paper since they analyse a homogeneous sample of 
residential care homes at the time the minimum wage was reintroduced in the UK.   
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on each and every employee within the WS thus allowing a precise 
measurement of ω.16  
Sample selection. In each cross-section wave of the WS small firms are 
randomly selected within strata formed by four-digit industries. Given the 
target population of small firms and the sampling quota the expectation was 
that about 350 firms could be followed in a short panel. In fact, the number 
of small enterprises observed in 2000 and 2001 amounted to 2,008. This 
regrettably calls into question the alleged independence of the cross-section 
samples but fortunately provides us with a sizable longitudinal sample 
drawn from a populace of firms heavily exposed to the minimum wage shock. 
Out of the 2,008 firms 1,818 had all the variables required for the 
estimation.  
Table 3: Small firm panel 2000-2001 - Probits of sample selection 
  
Sample Dependent 
variable = 1 
Number of 
employees 
Fraction low-
wage 
Lossmaker in 
2000 
Pseudo 
R2 
Nobs 
Small firms observed  
in 2000 
Also observed  
in 2001 
 
.0012 (2.43)  -.1074 (4.96)  -.1239 (5.93)  .0209  2,874 
Small firms observed in 
both 2000 and 2001 
Has complete 
data  
.0036 (2.51)  -.0099 (0.60)  -.0581 (3.17)  .0166  2,008 
*) The table shows the marginal effects 
 
The probits in Table 3 check how the estimation sample was selected from 
the base-period population of 2,874 small firms observed in. Firms also 
observed in May 2001 were larger, generated profit in the base period; and 
had fewer workers paid below the new minimum wage. The dropouts were 
predictably hit harder by the minimum wage hike therefore our model 
underestimates the extent and potentially adverse implications of the 
minimum wage shock. The estimation sample within the panel is also biased 
for larger firms and profit makers but does not systematically differ from the 
rest of the sample in terms of the base-period fraction of low-wage workers.  
Results.  The descriptive statistics of the estimation sample are 
presented in Table A1 of the Data Appendix. The median firm had 13 
                                                             
16 As discussed in the Data Appendix all firms above this size category are obliged to fill in the WS 
questionnaire but they are expected to provide individual data on only 10% sample of their workers.  
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employees of which 5 was paid below the new minimum wage, and was hit 
by an average wage shock of 11.2 %. Table 4 gives an overview of changes 
between 2000 and 2001 broken down by the size of the minimum wage 
shock. Real labor costs grew and employment fell as a function of exposure.  
Table 4: Small firms in the estimation sample – Performance in 2000-2001 
 
Characteristics in 2000  Mean log change 2000-2001   
Minimum 
wage shock 
(ω, percent) 
Fraction 
low-
wage 
Mean ω 
 
Average 
wage 
Labor 
cost/PPI 
Employ-
ment 
Output Number 
of firms 
0 0  0  .125  .062  .045  .046  468 
0-10  .274 .032 .158 .091 -.007 -.034 632 
10-25   .741 .166 .279 .177 -.054 -.007 319 
>  25  .959 .359 .399 .305 -.090 -.032 399 
         
All  firms  .435 .119 .224 .146 -.020  -.017  1,818 
 
 
Table 5 presents the 3sls estimates The wage setting equation suggests that 
the elasticities of real labor costs with respect to the minimum wage shock 
ranged between 0.66 and 0.77 with high-unemployment regions having 
slightly higher elasticities. Generally we find a lower level of compliance than 
earlier, using grouped or industry-level data on the whole economy. Base-
period profits have the expected sign. The labor demand equation suggests 
an output elasticity of 0.25 and a labor cost elasticity of –0.41. The implied 
elasticities of employment with respect to ω range between -0.27 and -0.32 
depending on region. 
Results from the alternative specifications are similar. Estimating the labor 
demand equation after substituting (4) to (5) yields ∂L/∂ω = α2⋅β1 = -0.31. The 
single equation IV with ω as the only instrument for w yields ∂L/∂w = -0.43. 
In these cases, too, the estimates for the interactions are higher in ’bad 
regions’. In a reduced form employment equation estimated with OLS ∂L/∂w= 
-0.03 reflecting strong attenuation bias due to the neglected endogeneity. 
Adding ω results in zero coefficient for w and ∂L/∂ω  = -0.33 reinforcing that 
employment was affected by the variations in exposure rather than the 
variations of w at given levels of exposure. 
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Table 5: 3sls estimates of employment and wages in small firms 2000-2001 
 
 Coeff  St.  error 
Dependent: log change in real labor cost    
Log minimum wage gap × 1
st region quartile  0.6554
*** 0.0537 
Log minimum wage gap × 2
nd region quartile  0.7071
*** 0.0674 
Log minimum wage gap × 3
rd region quartile  0.7629
*** 0.0678 
Log minimum wage gap × 4
th region quartile  0.7703
*** 0.1049 
Profit 2000  0.0003
** 0.0001 
Constant 0.1247   
Chi-sq 305.861  0.0000 
Dependent: log change of  employment    
Log change of output  0.2522
*** 0.0242 
Log change of labor cost  -0.4089
*** 0.1029 
Fixed assets/worker 2000  0.0006
* 0.0004 
Industry dummies (10)
  Yes 0.0794
4 
Region dummies (18)
  Yes 0.3322
4 
Constant 0.1299   
χ
2   140.125 0.0000 
Specification tests    
Exogeneity of labor cost (P>|t|)
1  0.001 
Exogeneity of output (P>|t|)
1  0.272 
Overidentification (P(χ
2))
 2   0.051 
Exclusion restrictions (P>F) 
3  0.002 
Durbin-Wu-Hausmann  test. 2) Sargant test 3) Joint significance of 
the excluded exogenous variables. 4) F-test of joint significance. The 
cases are weighted with base-period employment.  
Significant at the ***) 0.01 level **) 0.05 level *) 0.1 level 
 
What do these estimates tell about the magnitude of the minimum wage 
effect? A low-wage firm (ϖ=.36) with 20 employees located in a low-
unemployment region was estimated to lose 1.9 jobs as a result of the 
minimum wage hike while its counterpart operating in a high-unemployment 
area lost 2.4 jobs. The differences in case of 10-25 % share of low-wage 
workers (ϖ=.165) were lower with implied losses of 0.6 and 0.7 jobs. At the 
average shock and elasticity the loss amounted to 0.7 jobs. Firms with 5-20 
workers had a combined employment of 328,000 in the base period 
according to the available statistics. The results thus suggest that the 
minimum wage hike eliminated about 12,000 small-firm jobs mostly in the 
depressed regions – a huge loss in the Hungarian context.17 
Contrast with previous experience. When a national minimum wage is 
increased the variations in firm’s exposure is entirely determined by 
variations in their level of wages. If low wages in year t are generally 
                                                             
17 In these calculations we take into account that the direct impact of ω on q was isignificant as suggested by a 
parameter of 0.009 (0.14) in the first-stage regression.  
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conducive to employment cuts in year t+1  this linkage is captured in our 
model as a `minimum wage effect’. Indeed, low wages may result from poor 
firm performance indicative of forthcoming employment cuts, or signal lags 
in the process of wage adjustment so that the periods of low wage levels are 
followed by periods of fast wage growth and employment cuts. The results in 
Table 6 show that the changes of employment were unrelated to the level of 
wages and the share of low-wage workers in 1999-2000 unlike in the period 
of the minimum wage hike.18 
Table 6: Base period wages and employment growth, univariate OLS 
Dependent variable: log change of employment  1999-2000  2000-2001 
Base period log average wage  -0.014  0.40  0.056  3.49 
Fraction low-wage in 2000 (w<Ft 38,685 Æ 1.-16. percentiles)      -0.121  4.51 
Fraction low-wage in 1999 (1.-16. percentiles Æ w<Ft 34,953)  0.004  0.06     
Data source: FR 1999, 2000, 2001. Number of firms 1.046 in 1999-2000 and 1,818 in 2000-2001 
 
Puzzles. Readers familiar with the empirical literature on labor demand may 
find our output elasticity estimate of 0.25 suspiciously low. In fact, this 
result is consistent with those of Kőrösi (2002) who estimated short-run 
output elasticities of between 0.29 and 0.35 for 1996-99 using a differenced 
model and firm-level data. It is also consistent with the intuition that many 
small firms in services, trade, or tourism may have difficulties to adjust the 
number of workers to the fluctuations in turnover. The question of how labor 
productivity was raised in many hard-hit low-wage enterprises seems a 
harder nut to crack. (Real sales per worker grew by –1.3, -0.2, 4.3 and 8.8 % 
on average as we move from low to high levels of ω). We do not address the 
topic in this paper concerned with wether employment fell or rose following 
the minimum wage hike. The preliminary investigation suggests no shift 
from wage to non-wage costs (indicative of outsourcing) but the composition 
of the workforce did change in favor of more skilled workers in the most 
affected group of firms. The data base used here provides no information on 
hours but the LFS data do not indicate any growth in working hours 
                                                             
18 Data for firms employing 5-10 workers are only available since 1999. The short panels built for firms with 11-
20 workers in 1997-98 and before are too small for a similar kind of analysis (contain only about 100 firms).  
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between 2000 and 2001. The possibility that increased effort and better 
incentives also played a role, as proposed in efficiency wage models, can not 
be excluded.19  
8.  THE JOBLOSS RISKS OF MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS, 2001  
A minimum wage hike decided at a government office randomly divides the 
low-wage population into two parts. Workers whose pre-hike wages were just 
above the new minimum are likely to have similar human capital 
endowments and occupational characteristics to those who earned just 
below the line but their employers have no straightforward motivation to fire 
them as they are continued to be paid at their marginal products. These 
workers can also be indirectly affected because of wage spillovers or because 
the firm’s demand falls for the whole category of labor they belong to. Still 
there is likely to be a difference in the jobloss probabilities of those directly 
affected and those who are not, or only indirectly, influenced. Following this 
line of reasoning in this section we study how wages affected the jobloss 
hazards of full-time employees interviewed in the LFS Supplementary Survey 
of 2001 2nd quarter, the only wave since 1993 when respondents were asked 
about wages.  
We distinguish a treatment group (workers who were paid exactly the new 
minimum wage) from a control group (those who earned slightly more than 
that) and estimate the two group’s jobloss probabilities in 2001 using a 
discrete time duration model. Our approach is similar to that of Currie and 
Fallick (1996) and Abowd et al. (1997) both comparing workers paid the 
minimum wage with those earning just above the limit. 
Model. As shown in Jenkins (1995) by choosing the quarterly 
employment spells of individuals as the units of observation the exit hazard 
from a stock sample can be estimated with a logit model augmented with a 
baseline hazard function f(t):  
                                                             
19 The sampling rule of the WS does not allow a similar study of medium or large firms  because they reoprt 
individual data on a 10 % sample of their staff - insufficient for calculating F or ω except for enterprises 
employing 500 or more, thus reporting data on 50 or more, workers. Low-wage large firms had better than 
average employment records in 1999-2000 and worse than the average in 2000-2001 but the estimates are not 
significant at conventional levels within the small samples of 337 and 332 firms, respectively.  
25 
 
where t and τ denote time spent in the job, X stands for individual and 
environmental characteristics, w denotes a set of wage level dummies, and T 
represents calendar time.  
Sample restrictions. Workers in marginal jobs change employer frequently 
so they they tend to have high jobloss probabilities and low wages at any 
given point of time. In order to minimise the influence of this correlation we 
estimate model (6) for workers who spent at least two years in their jobs 
prior to the survey date. (The treated and the controls spent 6.7 and 7.3 
years in their jobs on average.) Workers were followed by the end of 2001. 
The reason of not following them for 5 quarters, the longest possible period 
allowed by the LFS design is that the second minimum wage shock exposed 
the control group to the same type of risk that hit the treatment group in 
2001. The analysis is restricted to full-time employees. After these 
restrictions the estimation sample contains  22,315 quarterly employment 
spells. 
The wage brackets. The wage data relate to gross monthly earnings as 
reported by the respondents, or estimated from the net figure by the CSO.20 
We distinguished between workers paid 90-110 cent of the minimum wage 
(treatment) and those earning 110-125 % (control), and three other categories 
earning even higher wages. 21 The brackets were chosen to maximise the 
distance between the treatment and control groups in terms of exposure to 
the minimum wage increase. Data from the WS-based individual panel 
introduced in section 3 suggested that the maximum distance is achieved by 
setting the brackets at 90-110 and 110-125 % - in this case the estimate is 
that 83.6 % of the treatment group was affected but only 54.4 % of the 
controls was unaffected. The control group is thus far from being first-best 
but we are not deeply concerned with it because, since the vast majority of 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
20 The gross figure is what labor contracts include in Hungary. 
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the misclassified workers are found in the control group, the model 
underestimates the treatment effect 22  
Results. There was a large and statistically significant difference between 
the members of the treatment and control groups in their probability of 
becoming unemployed in the 2nd -4th quarters of 2001 as shown by the 
parameters of 1.05 (3.00) versus 0.15 (0.31) significantly different from each 
other at the 0.04 level (Table 7).  
Table 7: Exit from employment 2001 2nd-4th quarters 
Discrete time duration model, multinomial logit form 
 
Left employment for:  Unemployment  Non-participation 
 Coefficient  Z  Coefficient  Z 
Male -.0948512  -0.31  -.5614574  -3.10 
Age .5115863  3.39  -.3338472  -6.75 
Age squared  -.0063266  -3.38  .0041778  7.01 
Unskilled blue collar.  -.1559254  -0.32  -.4750061  -1.20 
Semi-skilled blue collar  .1277137  0.33  .0850755  0.34 
Skilled blue collar  .2456568  0.64  -.004839  -0.02 
Unemployment (log)  -.0166451  -0.08  .3708437  2.54 
Public sector  -.9144718  -1.65  -.0598691  -0.22 
Union member  -.7294738  -1.82  .1420791  0.63 
Tenured job  -.3426703  -0.62  -.6559291  -2.08 
Wage Ft 36,000-44,000 (treatment)  1.059692  3.00  .1078196  0.44 
Wage Ft 44,000-50,000 (control)  .1494378  0.31  .0600268  0.19 
Wage Ft 75,000-100,000  -.5535763  -1.14  -.4572246  -1.63 
Wage Ft >100,000  -.0494438  -0.10  -.3114691  -0.97 
2001 4
th quarter  .3108904  1.09  .3152385  1.79 
Exp (-tenure in years)
  4.424675 2.61 -.265705 -0.09 
Constant -15.56376  -5.06  2.867735  2.50 
Nobs 22,315 
-log likelihood  1302.12 
Pseudo R
2 .0525 
F-test b_treatment=b_control (unemployment)                                                       4.13 (.0421) 
F-test b_treatment=b_control (non-participation)                                                   0.02 (.8906) 
Coefficients from an alternative specification:      
Wage Ft 36,000-44,000 (treatment) * U  3.967194  2.13  3.643163  2.37 
Wage Ft 44,000-50,000 (control) * U  -1.366391  -0.38  2.348137  1.27 
Wage Ft 50,000-75,000 * U  -3.870989  -0.93  3.903593  2.68 
Wage Ft 75,000-100,000 * U  -10.57837  -1.56  -.7622896  -0.29 
Wage > Ft 100,000 * U  -8.755421  -1.55  3.209584  1.20 
Reference categories are white collars, wage Ft 75,000-100,000, tenure>18 months.  
Standard errors adjusted for clustering by individuals 
Data source: LFS 2001 2
nd quarter Supplementary Survey, LFS 2001 3
rd and 4
th quarters <epanel38.dta> 
 
While the exit to non-participation hazards were equal in the two groups 
minimum wage workers were much more more likely to lose their jobs after 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
21 Workers earning less than Ft 36,000 were excluded from the estimation sample because this category 
apparently includes many workers planning to retire. Furthermore, we observed high wage mobility between this 
and other brackets suggesting that sub-minimum wages are often explained by temporary reasons.  
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at least two years of uniterrupted tenure and try to get back to work through 
active job search.  
The exit to unemployment hazards increased with regional unemployment 
within the minimum wage group while at higher wages the regional 
differences were negligible. However, in this case the equality of the 
coefficients can be rejected only at the 0.09 level, while the parameters for 
exit to non-participation are statistically equal. 
The estimated quarterly outflow to unemployment rates of a 25 year old 
male worker with 5 years of tenure were 0.243 and 0.119 % in the treatment 
and the control groups, respectively. These rates suggest rather long 
prospective tenures. For sake of illustration we can estimate the fraction 
staying in their jobs for the rest of their career ((1-h)160 given a retirement 
age of 65 and assuming constant hazard). This yields 67.5 and 82.6 % in the 
control and treatment groups, respectively.  
The sensitivity of the results to compositional differences between the 
treatment and control groups seem minimal. For workers with at least two 
years of tenure the exit to unemployment logit has only three significant 
parameters: the wage, age, and tenure. The average age of workers in the 
treatment (control) groups were 39.2 (40.0) years, and the average tenure 
was 6.67 (7.33) years. The predicted exit to unemployment rate setting 
aother variables at their default and unemployment at zero was 0.0167 in 
the treatment group. Using the average age and tenure of the control group 
the estimate is practically unchanged (0.0168) while the prediction for the 
control group is 0.0068, less than half of the treatment group’s exit rate. 
The admittedly small but statistically significant effects encourage us to 
conclude that the minimum wage workers, most of them paid above their 
marginal product right after the minimum wage increase, had higher 
probability of becoming unemployed in July-December 2001 than their 
observationally similar counterparts paid marginally higher wages. We also 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
22. It might also be mentioned at this point that the second minimum wage hike that became a credible 
promise/threat by the autumn of 2001 also biases the observed treatment effect downwards.  
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find weak evidence that the minimum wage workers of depressed regions 
were worse off than their counterparts in other districts. 
9.  OUTFLOWS FROM UNEMPLOYMENT 1998-2002 
The competitive theory of the minimum wage predicts a fall in the job 
finding probabilities of those unemployed who were paid below the new 
minimum wage prior to losing their jobs. Whether the actual outcome was 
predominantly shaped by this classic demand-side effect, or by more 
complex mechanisms offsetting the adverse impact of the minimum wage 
shock, is tested using a panel comprising 172 labor offices and 54 months 
from January 1998 to June 2002.  
For each office and month we know the number of low-wage and high-
wage workers in the UI stock at the beginning of the month and their exit to 
job rates (hLW and hHW) during the month. The same information is available 
for low-skilled and high-skilled workers (hLS and hHS).23 The return to 
comparing  low-wage and high-wage workers is clearly minimal as these 
groups largely differ in terms of skill levels and exposure to economic 
shocks. In order to get closer to a sensible comparison we study how the exit 
rates of low-wage workers related to the exit rates of low-skilled workers 
before and after the minimum wage hike.  
Model. The procedure we follow is closest in spirit to that in Deere, 
Murphy and Welch (1996)  analysing teenage employment after increasing 
the US federal minimum wage. We estimate equation (7): 
 
where hit is the exit rate at office i month t, LW and LS refer to low-wage and 
low-skilled workers, respectively, and MD and YRD are month and year 
dummies. The long-run averages of the office-level hLW/hHW ratios can differ 
depending on the typical duration of unemployment of the low-wage and 
                                                             
23 `Skilled` workers are those with secondary and higher education. `Low-wage` workers are those receiving 
lower than average unemployment benefit (see further details in the text). No information is available on the 
number of low-wage and high-wage workers within skill categories and vice versa. 
) 7 ( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( 4 3 2 1 it i it it
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unskilled groups – the resulting time-invarying fixed effects are captured by 
the ci-s.24 The expectations are β1=1, β2≤0 (it is more difficult for low-wage 
workers to find jobs when the market is depressed) and β4=[0] unless some 
unexpected shocks divert the hLW/hHW ratio from its long-run average. Prior 
to the minimum wage hike the year effects are expected to fall close to zero 
but a significant break is anticipated in 2001. The relative exit rate of low-
wage workers may have fallen more (or less) in high-unemployment regions – 
this is tested by interacting a dummy for the post-hike period with regional 
unemployment to allow β4 to differ across provinces.  
The equation has to be instrumented for obvious endogeneity on the one 
hand, and possible correlation between the residual and hLS on the other. 
Some sort of regional shocks may exert particularly strong impact on hLS 
relative to hLS. When whole plants are closed or opened employers screen 
their workers/applicants more carefully and while doing so they interpret 
low-wages as a signal of low productivity – this establishes a link between 
the changes of hLS and the residual. The sign of the correlation is a priori 
unclear since hLW is expected to rise less when hLS is rising, and fall more 
when hLS is falling. We instrument hLS with its t-1 period value.25 
Distinction between high and low wage workers. The labor offices record 
the recipients’ earnings in the four calendar quarters preceding their current 
unemployment spells. Since the benefits are earnings-related they also 
provide an indirect measure and we use them as a proxy of the wage. 
Though pre-unemployment earnings are known they relate to different time 
periods - computing the present value of past earnings case by case would 
have enormously increased the costs of data collection. Data from the EJS 
show, however, that the benefit is indeed a good proxy of the wage: 98.7 % of 
the workers receiving lower than average benefits earned less than the 
                                                             
24 The mean benefit divides the population of UI recipients to fractions of varying size depending on the regions’ 
wage level. The difference in the skill endowments of the median recipient and the median low-wage recipient 
tends to be smaller in low-wage regions, which provides an explanation for the regional fixed effects. Regional 
differences in the share of seasonal low-wage industries add a further component to ci. 
25 Further complications might arise from the fact that the composition this monts`s inflows have an impact on 
the composition of next months`s stock. We neglect this feedback because job finds account for less than 1/3 of 
the total outflows from the UI stock and the latter is also largely affected by the inflows. It is also worth noting  
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median wage prior to unemployment, and 87.2 % of the high-benefit 
recipients had higher than median wages. Altogether, 92.3% of the UI 
recipients could be correctly classified as ’low-wage’ or ’high-wage’ on the 
basis of the benefit.  
Low-wage versus low-skilled workers. The available data suggest that the 
exit rate of all low-wage workers (hLW) relative to the exit rate of all low-
skilled workers (hLS) can be considered a crude approximation of the wage-
level specific job finding rate (hLW|LS) within the unskilled group. In 
particular, the EJS suggested that as much as 81.4 % of the low-wage 
workers were low-skilled but only 48.8 % of the low-skilled were low-wage.26  
Table 8: The exit to job rate of low-wage UI recipients 1998- 2002 
Panel estimates using monthly data from 172 labor offices, January 1998 – June 2002 
 
Dependent: log exit rate of the 
low-wage recipients 
FE - IV 
Missing values replaced
FE - IV 
Cases with missing 
values dropped 
FE 
Missing values replaced 
Log exit rate of low-skilled  1.0242 17.13 0.9560 15.96  0.8120  105.51 
Regional unemployment   -0.0191  0.64  -0.0224  0.82  -0.0444  2.70 
1999 -0.0199  1.80  -0.0199  1.97  -0.0274  2.68 
2000 -0.0062  0.48  0.0051  0.41  0.0267  2.59 
2001 -0.0883  5.88  -0.0742  5.26  -0.0451  4.36 
2002 -0.1173  6.56  -0.0960  5.83  -0.0712  5.43 
Constant -0.0150  0.007  -0.2346  1.08  -0.5988  21.79 
Within R2  0.7190  0.7363  0.7409 
Overall R2  0.7773  0.7846  0.7818 
Number of observations  9116  8975  9116 
Wald chi2  738744  890437  F=1502.44 
F-test. H0: β1=1  0.16 0.6857 0.47 0.4909  591.96 0.0000 
Alternative specifications:             
(i)            
2001-2002 dummy  -0.0871  8.42  -0.0778  8.07  -0.0536  7.35 
(ii)            
2001-2002 × 1
st quartile  -0.0863 5.31 -0.0782 5.37  -0.0589  4.12 
2001-2002 × 2
nd quartile  -0.0548 3.15 -0.0563 3.60  -0.0441  3.09 
2001-2002 × 3
rd quartile  -0.0967 5.69 -0.0873 5.63  -0.0605  4.18 
2001-2002 × 4
th quartile  -0.0992 5.21 -0.0819 4.58  0.0521  3.59 
Notes. The unemployment rates relate to the area served by the office and defined as the ratio of registered 
unemployment to the working age population. The Budapest office areas are treated as one unit. 
 
Results. The evolution of the quarterly relative exit to job rates of low-wage 
workers are shown in Table A3. The estimation results of equation (7) are 
shown in Table 8 . In 2 % of the cases the exit rate of low-wage workers were 
zero – in one version these cases were excluded and in the other the zeros 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
that there is no straightforward link between the flows of the UI system and unemployment. In 2000 less than 
20% of the ILO-unemployed received UI. (MT 2001 227-230).   
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were replaced assuming the outflow of ½ person. The qualitative results are 
identical.  
In the fixed effects model β1 falls short of unity while in the IV it does not 
significantly differ from the expectation of β1=1. When unemployment 
increases the relative exit probability of the low-wage recipients falls but this 
effect is not significant at conventional levels. The month effects  (not 
displayed) hint at changes in the composition of the low-wage unemployed 
pool over the year.27 Most importantly, the results suggest that the job 
finding probability of the low-wage unemployed relative to the unskilled 
dropped by 7-9 percentage points in 2001 and further 2-3 percentage points 
in January-June 2002. 
In Table 9 the pair-wise equality of the year effects are tested using the 
coefficients from version B. The parameters for 1998-2000 are not 
significantly different from zero and each other. Those for 2001 and 2002 are 
strongly different from zero and any of the previous year effects. 20001 and 
2002 are different at the .95 but not at the .99 level of significance. Treating 
the pre- and post-hike periods as different regimes by estimating the same 
equation with a dummy for 2001-2002 provides a coefficient of -.087.  
Table 9. F-test for the equality of year effects 
 
 1999  2000  2001  2002 
1998  3.25 0.22 34.5
** 43.1
** 
1999   0.89  17.8
** 27.3
** 
2000     58.5
** 63.1
** 
2001       4.66
* 
Significant at the **) 0.01  *) 0.05 level 
 
Interacting this ‘regime dummy’ with dummies for the four quartiles of 
regional unemployment (treating the hLW/hLS ratio of all regions in 1998-
2000 as the reference) yields statistically equal parameters for all regions. In 
evaluating this result one has to take into account that while the fixed effects 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
26 If the wage level is inferred from the benefit, as happens in this section, the respective proportions are 82.1 and 
56.7 %. 
27 The sum of the β3 coefficients is above zero. Presumably, the reason is that during the Fall and Winter when 
unskilled job opportunities are scarce many young, low-wage unemployed return to employment from  
`unemployment holiday`. This increases h
LW relative to a falling h
LS.  
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capture the long-term differences in hLW relative to hLS they do not control for 
the regional variations in the changes of the two exit rates in response to a 
wage shock. In low-wage region more unskilled workers are low-wage 
therefore hLW/hLS changes little when hLW falls. In high-wage regions a wage-
related shock affects hLW stronger than hLS so the ratio falls substantially. Id 
this bias exists it leads to an underestimation of the effect hitting the low-
wage regions.  
The UI register is incapable of providing a full picture on how the job 
finding probabilities of the jobless were changing after the minimum wage 
hike. Only 14 % of the working age non-employed population (excluding 
students and pensioners) received UI at the eve of 2001 – a small and non-
randomly selected minority. Unfortunately, the LFS provides no data on the 
previous wages of the non-employed, preventing the researchers from a 
comprehensive study of outflows from non-employment. We see no reason to 
assume, however, that the robust changes observed with the insured 
unemployed are specific to this particular segment of the labor market. 
10. CONCLUSIONS 
Every bit of information we could analyse suggested that the Hungarian 
government’s decision to increase the minimum wage by 57 % in 2001 
implied a loss of employment opportunities. Despite the brutal price shock 
the immediate effect did not seem dramatic, however. Similarly to Rama 
(2000) and Alatas and Cameron (2003) analysing Indonesia – the country 
providing the closest analogue to Hungary’s minimum wage experiment - we 
found no significant link between exposure to the minimum wage hike and 
subsequent employment change with large firms. In the same time the small 
firm sector lost about 3 % of its jobs in less than a year, and the job 
retention and job finding probabilities of low-wage workers deteriorated. The 
depressed regions were more severely affected despite their conditions that 
favour a positive employment effect. The results underline the relevance of 
the classic framework in predicting minimum wage effects. 
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Data appendix 
FR – Financial Reports 
The FR data contain the tax sheets of enterprises, collected by the Ministry of Finance. The 
sample used in this paper is restricted to firms observed in the WS. The reports include a 
full account of assets and liabilites and of annual intakes and costs including the annual 
average number of employees, wages and taxes, sales revenues, material and other costs, 
and depriciation. The firms can be identified across waves. The descriptive statistics of the 
estimation sample are presented in Table A1. 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics of the small firm panel (N=1818) 
 
Variable Mean  Median Standard 
deviation 
Employment 2000  12.7  13  4.44 
Employment 2001  13.6  12  14.30 
Value added 2000 (mFt)  227.5  91.5  712.3 
Value added 2001 (mFt)  251.3  98.0  891.6 
PPI 2000-2001  1.066  1.063  0.025 
Average wage 2000 (mFt)  0.824  0.583  0.901 
Average wage 2001 (mFt)  0.978  0.700  0.992 
Profit 2000 (mFt)  3.27  1  38.3 
Assets/worker (mFt) 2000  4.816  1.333  29.1 
Fraction low-wage 2000  0.434  0.355  0.392 
Minimum wage shock (ω)  0.119 0.043  0.144 
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WS – Wage Survey 
 
The National Labor Centre’s Wage Survey is an annual survey conducted in May 1986, 
1989, and each May since 1992. It covers a representative sample of firms and 10% random 
samples of their workers. In the waves used in this paper the sampling procedure was the 
following (i) the firm census provided by the CSO serves as the sampling frame (ii) it is a 
legal obligation of each firm employing more than 20 workers to fill in a firm-level 
questionaire and provide individual demographic and wage data on a 10 % random sample 
of the employees. (iii) it is a legal obligation of each budget institution irrespective of size to 
fill in an insitution-level questionaire and provide individual demographic and wage data on 
all employees (iii) Firms employing less than 20 workers according to the census are 
sampled by the NLC in a sampling procedure stratified by 4-digit industries. The firms 
contacted by the NLC are legally obliged to fill in an firm-level questionaire and provide 
individual demographic and wage data on all employees. The cases are weighted to ensure 
representativity. An individual weight (w1) stands for the number of workers represented by 
the respondent given the sampling quota within his/her firm. The original survey does not 
contain information on firm-level non-response. Comparing employment in the target 
population by 4-digit industry and firm size with the sample a second weight (w2) was 
attached to firms by the authors of this paper. The final weights (w1⋅w2) restore 
representativity under the assumption that non-response is uncorrelated with variables in 
the calculations. The number of individual observations varied between 180 and 185 
thousand in 1999-2001. 
LFS – Labor Force Survey 
The LFS is a representative quarterly household survey conducted by the Central Statistical 
Office since 1992. Data are collected about each member of the surveyed households and an 
‘activity qustionaire’ is filled with those aged 15-74. The survey has a rotating panel 
structure with each quarter 1/6 of the sample dropped after spending 6 quarters in the 
survey, and replaced with a randomly chosen new cohort. The number of observations 
varied between 82 and 85 thousand in 1999-2001. The individuals can be identified across 
waves. The cases are weighted by the CSO to ensure representativity. All calculations in this 
paper used these weights.  
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Table A2: Jobloss - Descriptive statistics of the estimation sample 
 
 Mean  St.  dev. 
Exit to unemployment  0.30   
Exit to non-participation  0.73   
Male .5245165  .4994098 
Age 40.27192  10.36101 
Unskilled blue collarl  .0759896  .2649874 
Semi-skilled blue collar  .1689385  .374706 
Skilled blue collar  .3502658  .4770638 
Regional unemployment  .0925442  .0597517 
Public sector  .1741024  .379206 
Union member  .2502028  .4331394 
Tenured job  .9617706  .191754 
Wage Ft 36,000-44,000   .1522365  .3592581 
Wage Ft 44,000-50,000  .0932583  .2908006 
Wage Ft 75,000-100,000  .1919952  .3938781 
Wage Ft >100,000  .1718567  .3772643 
2001 4
th quarter  .434425  .4956924 
Tenure in job (years)  7.292149  2.872526 
Number of spells  22,315 
 
 
LFS Supplementary Survey April-June 2001 
The LFS does not collect wage data. In this particular wave respondents working as 
employees or cooperative members (22,415 out of 30,485 workers employed by the ILO-
OECD definition) were asked to tell their last months’s gross or net earnings. The gross 
value of net earnings was calculated by the CSO using PIT tables. We used the gross figures 
as reported by the CSO and weighted the cases followed in a spell panel with their base 
period weights of April-June 2001. 
NLC Office-level Exit to Jobs Panel 1998-2002 
The data base was built in the National Labor Centre in September 2002 using data from 
Hungary’s 175 labor offices . It contains aggregate stock and ouflow to jobs data broken 
down by the level of education (primary or lower; vocational; secondary and higher), and the 
level of the benefit (lower or equal/higher than the national mean). The stock figures relate 
to the first day of the month and the flows relate to the month. Three offices were involved in 
reorganisation during the period of observation and were dropped from the sample analysed 
in this paper. The unemployment rates attached to the offices are ILO-OECD counts divided 
by the population of working age, as estimated by the CSO, in the territory of the office. Job 
finds exclude entry to public works or other programs for the unemployed. The number of 
recipients leaving UI for reasons other than job finding is also available. 
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Table A3. Exit from unemployment to jobs (quarterly means) 
 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
  Low-skilled (primary or vocational education) 
1998 .074 .063 .056 .034 
1999 .066 .063 .055 .036 
2000 .071 .076 .063 .047 
2001 .080 .082 .069 .041 
2002 .077       
 Low-wage  (benefit<mean) 
1998 .065 .063 .059 .034 
1999 .058 .060 .057 .036 
2000 .064 .074 .066 .047 
2001 .068 .074 .067 .038 
2002 .062       
 Low-skilled  =  1 
1998 0.897 0.983 1.047 1.059 
1999 0.904 0.970 1.031 1.019 
2000 0.895 0.976 1.058 1.007 
2001 0.857 0.909 0.969 0.930 
2002 0.811      .. 
                *) Benefit<mean. Source: Data provided by the National Labor Centre  
 
NLC EJS – National Labor Centre Exit to Jobs Survey, April 2001 
Following a similar survey in April 1994 the NLC interviewed all workers leaving the UI 
register because of finding a  job between March 22 2001 and April 7 2001. The workers 
were interviewed when they contacted the offices to collect the documents necessary to take 
up employment. They were saked about their minimum and maximum expected gross 
monthly earnings in the first months after being hired. The file used in this paper contains 
the data of 105,957 recipients in the stock on 22 March 2001 and interviews with 9,131 
workers finding a job. Of them, 8,811 workers provided wage data. The wage and benefit 
concepts used in the paper are (i) gross monthly earnings in the four calendar quarters 
spent in employment prior to the last UI spell adjusted for wage inflation between the time 
of entry to UI and March 2001. (ii) The mean of the minimum and maximum expected 
earnings (iii) the monthly value of the pre-tax daily UI benefit assuming 30.5 days a month. 
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table B1: The probability of sub-minimum wage in May 2000 – Logit 
(Full-time employees of firm employing at least 5 workers, budget sector excluded) 
 
Dependent: earned less than 38,685 Ft in May 2000  Odds ratios Z 
Male   0.7341      -15.33  
Experience 1-4 years      2.0834       18.12  
Experience 5-9 years    1.3192      10.27  
Experience 25-35 years    0.6194     -21.84  
Experience >35 years   0.6221      -17.13  
Primary education    2.8669      40.32  
Vocational education    1.6279      21.54  
Higher education   0.4054      -21.14  
Joined the firm in 1999    1.4367      14.71  
Firm size: 5-20 employees    12.3800       42.36  
Firm size: 21-50 employees    6.5751      30.86  
Firm size: 51-300 employees    3.0361       19.06  
Firm size: 301-1000 employees    1.6717        8.48  
Firm size: 1001-3000 employees    0.8407       -2.59  
Foreign ownership   0.7009       -8.64  
Private domestic    1.8482      18.40  
No majority owner     2.2570      11.24  
Value added/worker <1.39 mFt    7.8319       61.73  
Value added/worker 1.39-2.19 mFt    3.0962       33.50  
Value added/worker 2.19-4.22 mFt    1.6077      13.95  
Regional unemployment 2
nd quartile    1.1645        5.68  
Regional unemployment 3
rd quartile    1.4400       13.65  
Regional unemployment 4
th quartile    1.5927      14.04  
Budapest    1.1829       5.97  
Lake Balaton    1.3359       3.99  
Industries (6 largest and 6 smallest odds ratios out of 55)   
Insurance    70.8793      38.52  
Hotels and restaurants    6.3720      23.39  
Forestry    5.3203      13.99  
Transport other than railways, airways, and public transport    4.8603      20.09  
Services other than business-related, cultural, and public    4.8408      13.93  
Textiles    4.3558      17.51  
…   
Electric energy    0.8669       -0.81  
Research and development   0.3697       -2.22  
Tobacco     0.1610      -1.33  
Banking   0.1513      -11.28  
Public transport    0.0130       -1.96  
Petroleum mining and refining (no minimum wage workers)  .. .. 
Number of observations  119,739  
Pseudo R2  0.3487  
LR chi2 (71)  45224.25  
Reference categories are female; 10-24 years of experience; secondary education; firm size over 
3000 employees; state ownership; value added/worker over 4.16 mFt; 1
st quartile of micro-regions 
by unemployment; engineering industry 
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Table B2: Full-time employees paid near the minimum wage 2001 
 
Percentage shares      /      Data source:  WS, May  LFS, April-June 
Teenagers (under 20)  1.3  1.8 
Youths (under 25)  18.6  20.0 
Older workers (over 55)  4.5  3.9 
Experience<5 years  9.3  4.4 
Experience<10 years  27.5  21.6 
Experience<20 years  53.5  50.5 
Tenure<1 year  approx. 20.6*  25.3 
Tenure<2 years  n.a.  38.1 
Tenure<5 years  n.a.  60.9 
Women 56.0  54.1 
0-7 grades  1.0  1.6 
Primary school (8 grades)  29.4  29.8 
Vocational (without ’maturity’ certificate)  38.6  40.2 
Secondary   27.0  25.3 
Higher 4.0  3.1 
Firm size<5 employees  n.a.  15.8-20.2** 
Excluding firms with less than 5 employees:     
5-20 workers  49.9  n.a. 
21-50 workers  15.2  n.a. 
51-300 workers  18.0  n.a. 
>300 workers  7.9  n.a. 
Budget institutions  8.9  n.a. 
Authors’ calculation from the Wage Survey (May 2001) and the Labor Force Survey (2001. 2
nd quarter 
Supplement). The WS data cover full-time employees of firms employing more than 5 workers. The LFS data 
cover all employees paid a wage in 2001 2
nd quarter. *) The WS records if the worker entered the firm in the 
preceding year (tenure: 5-17 months). **) The LFS data on firm size are not comparable to the WS data. The <5 
category comprises small budget institutions like the local governments or schools of villages in the LFS.  
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